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ABSTRACT 
SAFETY AND THE SMALL SATELLITE BUILDER 
BY JAMES S. (SID) SMITH 
EXPANDING HORIZONS 
SAFETY CONSULTING SERVICES 
The importance of safety and the early understanding and 
incorporation of safety requirements into all phases of 
the small satellite's life can not be over-emphasized. 
Safety is an engineering discipline, a mind set, a 
concious practice of all involved in the small satellite. 
There are numerous safety requirements which must be 
complied with and there are numerous processes and pro-
cedures which the small satellite must be subjected to. 
Being aware of the requirements and procedures and 
assuring their accomplishment is a total project 
responsibility. Risk cannot be totally eliminated, 
but it can be managed and controlled. This paper was 
written to provide some information on the steps to 
successful Risk Management and Risk Acceptance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aerospace accidents which occurred last year have given all of us a 
heightened awareness of the need to emphasize safety. The accident 
showed dramatically and conclusively the rapidity with which a disaster 
can happen. The accident should have provided a lesson in the importance 
of systems integration and analysis of the requirement to thoroughly 
understand the interaction of components and the overall synergy of 
systems. This paper was written to discuss, define and clarify the 
systems safety aspects of small satellites and their environments. 
OVERVIEW 
This paper has been prepared in three sections with the intent to 
provide some systems safety philosophy and understanding; a discussion 
of requirements, their meanings and application methods; and a summation 
with background information. 
SCOPE 
The intended scope of this paper is the coverage of systems safety for 
small satellites. However, totally necessary to any discussion of 
satellite safety is an accompanying discussion of booster interfaces 
and interactions and ground processing methods, procedures and support 
requirements. All are totally interrelated and all requirements have 
been written with the total integrated system in mind. 
DISCUSSION 
Perhaps the single most important factor in the incorporation of safety 
requirements into a product is that they be incorporated during the 
initial design phase. This of course implies that the designers have 
a thorough knowledge of safety requirements and an understanding of the 
rationale for why the requirements were formulated. All too often -
usually when no one person has been assigned safety responsibility -
the satellite developer learns after hardware has been produced that 
some change will be required to satisfy a safety requirement. This 
situation creates turmoil throughout all levels of management, in-
creases the cost and frustrates the customer. 
Safety requirements are based upon several factors with the prevention 
of death or injury and the prevention of damage or loss of property 
being the major drivers. Operational responsibility is the determin-
ant for whose requirements must be met. If the satellite is to be 
processed and launched by the Department of Defense, one set of 
requirements must be met. If the satellite is to be launched aboard 
a Space Shuttle and processed by NASA, another set of requirements 
(1) 
must be. met. There is'a third case when a satellite is launched on 
a NASA booster and processed through NASA facilities - such as Wallops 
Island and even a fourth case where a spacecraft is processed in a 
NASA or DOD facility and launched by NASA on a DOD installation - the 
NASA Delta launch pad (SLC-2) at Vandenberg AFB is an example of this 
case. The safety issue of satellites launched on commercially developed/ 
owned boosters is just now being addressed and will undoubtedly have 
a number of variations too. 
Safety requirements are found in a number of different types of docu-
ments and become applicable when the launch/processing agency so 
directs. Requirements may be in the form of MIL-Standards; Government 
regulations; American Nation~l Standards Institute standards; Boiler, 
Electrical and Fire Codes; and various NASA Handbooks, Specifications 
and Manuals. With the large number of documents from which to draw 
requirements, conflicts are not uncommon. Usually, conflicts are 
resolved by applying the "whichever is the most stringent" rule to 
the design. Unfortunately, application of this rule is often need-
lessly expensive. When this case occurs, negotiation to the "common 
sense" application level is required. In order to successfully reach 
a negotiated settlement, the developer must have a thorough knowledge 
of the intent of the requirement and be able to show that the system 
complies with the intent. 
DEFINITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS 
Key terminology which the safety engineer/safety manager must become 
familiar with includes risk management, risk acceptance and hazard 
reduction. All are components of each other. All define the boundaries 
of the safety program and measure its effectiveness. 
Risk management is the combination of designs, procedures and verifica-
tions which enable the operator of systems to function safely. 
Hazard reduction is the methodology for reducing hazards and consists 
of the following elements which should be applied to systems in order 
of precedence: 
a) Design for Minimum Hazard - design out the problem. 
b) Safety Devices - when the hazard cannot be designed out, control 
it with automatic safety devices which are incorporated into the 
design. 
c) Warning Devices - when neither design nor safety devices can 
control hazard warning devices capable of detecting and providing 
notice to operators in sufficient time to allow the use of emergency 
procedures or corrective actions to return the system to a safe 
conditi on. 
d) Special Procedures - Used when design, safety and warning devices 
cannot be used to control hazards. 
Risk acceptance is the acknowledgement that there is a risk in operating 
the system but that the risk has been quantified through verification 
methods and that the system can be safely operated. 
(2) 
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Safety analyses are narative assessments of the methods used for 
controlling hazards. Safety analyses are prepared in preliminary and 
final forms and cover both design and operations. The safety analyses 
are used in conjunction with drawings, procedures, and supporting 
analyses to prove the safety of the system to launch and processing 
agencies. References for preparation of the safety analyses are found 
in Data Item Descriptions DI-SAFT-80101, DI-SAFT-80102 and DI-SAFT-80103 
(Ref. 1) for NASA expendible and DOD programs. NASA Shuttle programs 
use JSC 13830 (Ref. 3) as the reference guide for the preparation of 
safety analysis reports. If the program is sponsored by the Air Force 
Space Division, the Safety Assessment Reports will be collected in the 
Accident Risk Assessment Report (Ref. 2). 
The systems safety program plan is used to define the system safety 
program which will be used in support of the development effort. The 
plan will show functional interfaces and describe organizational 
responsibilities. A systems safety program plan is required to the 
DOD but is optional to NASA. For the developer1s own use and general 
guidance, a system safety program plan should be prepared even though 
it may not be required. Data Item Description DI-SAFT-80100 (Ref. 1) 
system safety program plan should be used as a guide. 
PROCEDURES 
The importance of incorporating safety requirements into the design 
and th~ early analyses for verification of incorporation cannot be 
over emphasized. To assure the timely incorporation of safety re-
quirements safety should be a key item on the agenda of all design 
reviews. The person responsible for safety should make a presentation 
which details his understanding of the requirements, his methods for 
assuring their incorporation, and his role in the verification process. 
He should also describe acceptance criteria and his methods for evalua-
ting acceptance. 
Both the DOD and NASA have established phased safety reviews for STS 
payloads which are conducted during the course of the design effort 
and evaluate the incorporation of safety requirements through the 
maturity of the program. Entry into the process will be accomplished 
either by submitting the safety data to the NASA Johnson Space Center 
safety office for NASA sponsored payloads, or, DOD sponsored payloads 
will be processed by and the data submitted through the sponsoring 
Systems Program Office (SPO). 
A more informal process exists for payloads which are to be launched 
on expendable boosters and is normally conducted by the launch and 
processing agency to determine that the system can be processed and 
launched without causing injury to personnel or damage to facilities 
or equipment. Payloads processed for launch on either the Eastern 
Test Range or the Western Test Range must comply with the requirements 
of each range1s safety requirements regulations (Refs. 4 and 5). 
Payload builders having NASA sponsorship will be required to submit 
their safety data to the sponsoring NASA organization at the respective 
(3) 
test range and that sponsor will perform the interface activities 
between the payload builder and the DOD launch agent. Payloads which 
are to be launched on DOD boosters will provide their data directly to 
the Safety Office at the respective test ranges. 
After a review of the data by the appropriate agencies, DOD or NASA 
Safety Review Teams or Test Range Safety personnel, the operator is 
given written approval to process, launch and operate the satellite. 
The approval may be granted as requested or with conditions stipulated. 
SUMMARY 
Safety must be considered for all phases and all aspects of the small 
satellite just as surely as it must be considered for large satellites, 
boosters, and support equipment. Safety requirements are usually common 
sense application of good engineering design. System safety is systems 
engineering using a different set of criteria. The safety manager is 
a member of the design team and is responsible for assuring that safety 
requirements are incorporated during design and that all engineers 
understand the safety requirements and acceptable methods for applying 
them. Safety verification is part of overall systems testing and must 
be considered when developing test plans and procedures. 
Safety approvals are a key element of operations and are frequently 
time consuming. Therefore, an approval cycle must be incorporated 
into system schedules. The documentation required to support the 
approval process is logical and readily developed during the design 
process. 
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
Mr. Sid Smith (Colonel USAF) retired from the U.S. Air Force in 1985 
after 24 years of experience in all aspects of Space and Missile System 
Engineering and Operations. Specific positions of responsibility include: 
- Deputy Missile Combat Crew Commander Atlas F ICBM 
- Gemini and Apollo Flight Controller 
- Upgrade Program Systems Engineer for the Minuteman III 
Weapon System 
- DOD Accident Preventi~n Manager for all DOD STS Launched 
Payloads 
- Commander Air Force Western Test Range 
Since January of 1987 Mr. Smith has been an independent safety con-
sultant and is the owner of Expanding Horizons Safety Consulting 
Services. Customers for his services include: 
Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo, CA and Vandenberg AFB 
- Safety transition work and definition of Space Test Range 
Safety (on orbit safety) 
Astro Aerospace Corporation, Carpinteria, CA 
- Safety Analyses, Safety Planning Engineer training for the 
Deployable Mast Subsystem - a NASA program, and for MILSTAR -
a DOD program 
Webb Murray and Associates, Inc., Houston, TX 
- Proposal preparation for the Vandenberg AFB Systems Safety 
Support Contract. Fire Protection Systems Design marketing 
to Santa Barbara County and the local oil industry 
Mr. Smith was the first DOD recipient of the NASA Silver Snoopy Award 
which is an award presented by the Astronaut Office to individuals who 
have made significant contributions to the safety and reliability of 
Manned Spaceflight. 
